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Introduction: 	
How do we explain the emergence of judicial assertiveness in repressive environments? When 
judges challenge autocrats they do so knowing autocrats may very well retaliate. Despite the 
repressive capacity of authoritarian regimes, and the lack of institutional safeguards protecting 
judicial independence, judiciaries have shown the temerity to challenge those regimes in 
countries as diverse as Spain, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Maldives, often risking their authority, 
positions, and sometimes even their freedom.1 In 2007, Pakistan’s Supreme Court challenged the 
foundations of General Musharraf’s regime in a series of landmark decisions, at a time when the 
regime was stable without any clear political opening or weakness to explain increasing judicial 
assertiveness.2  Even when the regime slashed the powers of the judiciary, and attempted to 
coerce judges into pledging loyalty to the regime, a majority of judges refused to swear an oath, 
losing their positions and even facing detention. Such high-risk assertiveness defies the 
expectations of rational choice theories. Therefore, this article develops a framework to explain 
the development of judicial norms and preferences that motivate judicial assertiveness even 
against powerful autocrats. Understanding the processes shaping judicial assertiveness against 
authoritarian regimes provides critical insights into the ideas and interests underlying judicial 
behavior, and the conditions under which judiciaries can emerge as sources of resistance and 
opposition in authoritarian regimes.  
  Judicial assertiveness is manifested when courts challenge powerful actors through their 
rulings, i.e. when courts seek to nullify, restrict or change the behavior of actors through judicial 
decisions.3 Since high-risk judicial assertiveness cannot be reconciled with the motivation to 
protect the court’s policymaking authority from authoritarian backlash, explaining high-risk 
judicial assertiveness against authoritarian regimes requires engaging with other interests of 
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judges, including reputation building and job satisfaction, as well as the construction of judges’ 
ideas and preferences.4 In-depth studies of judiciaries in individual states have shown that unique 
features of the institutional structure of the judiciary shape the ideas and interests of judges in 
authoritarian regimes.5 This article uses the Pakistan case to develop a theory to explain variation 
in judicial behavior across diverse authoritarian settings, and shed light on how formal and 
informal relationships between the regime and the judiciary shape the interests and ideas 
informing judicial behavior.6  
  I argue that the judiciary converges on a set of institutional norms and preferences in 
response to the preferences of the institutions and networks, or audiences, with which judges 
interact.7 Judicial behavior is shaped by both material interests, including the advancement of 
careers and furthering political authority, and non-material interests including esteem-building 
and job satisfaction. The critical audiences for the judiciary are i) institutions and organizations 
that impact judges’ careers and ii) social and professional networks with which judges seek to 
build esteem. 
  Institutional interlinkages provide the regime or other actors the means to shape the 
internal structure and culture of judicial institutions. If the regime and its allies share institutional 
interlinkages with the judiciary, then the regime becomes a critical audience affecting the careers 
and esteem of judges, thus shaping the judicial norms and preferences underlying judicial 
behavior. I argue that variation in the institutional interlinkages between regime and judiciary 
will shape variation in judicial assertiveness against authoritarian regimes. As the regime’s 
institutional interlinkages with the judiciary decrease, the regime’s role as an audience shaping 
judicial norms and preferences decreases, and the judiciary is more likely to develop norms and 
preferences that clash with the regime, leading the judiciary to act assertively even against stable 
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and repressive authoritarian regimes.  
   The audience-based framework highlights the importance of both formal institutional and 
informal network relationships in explaining judicial assertiveness and incorporates insights from 
political sociology into the study of judicial institutions.8 Further, it bridges the gap between the 
study of authoritarian strategy and judicial ideology by outlining an interactive framework that 
can explain both how judges develop norms and preferences in response to their relationship 
with regimes, and how autocrats develop institutional interlinkages to manipulate the interests of 
judges and ensure judicial values and preferences align with the regime.   
  In this article, I first discuss the literature on judicial behavior which this study 
contributes to, and then outline the audience-based framework. Based on this framework, I 
propose a typology of relationships between regimes and judiciaries that can explain variations 
in judicial assertiveness across different authoritarian regimes. Then I evaluate the audience-
based framework through a cross-temporal study of superior judiciaries under three authoritarian 
regimes in Pakistan. I conduct a close primary analysis of judiciary-regime relations in Pakistan, 
under three military rulers: Ayub Khan, Zia ul Haq, and Pervez Musharraf. The interlinkages 
between the regime and the judiciary vary across these regimes, as does judicial assertiveness 
towards the regimes. Pakistan provides an especially useful set of cases since the Pakistani 
judiciary was known to be the ‘junior partner’ of Ayub’s regime, but emerged as the primary 
challenger to Musharraf ‘s regime facilitating a spectacular and successful democratization 
movement. For each period, I rely on the content of judicial decisions, information gleaned from 
newspaper archives and interviews with lawyers and judges.9 Using these sources of evidence, I 
show how variation in institutional interlinkages across the regimes explains loyal judicial 
support for military supremacy under Ayub, deferential support to military supremacy under Zia, 
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and finally judicial competition with military supremacy under Musharraf.  Finally, I briefly 
consider the generalizability of the audience-based framework to regimes beyond Pakistan.  
 
Judicial Assertiveness in Authoritarian Regimes: 
  
Scholars of judicial politics have demonstrated growing interest in understanding the emergence 
of assertive judiciaries outside the context of established democracies, including authoritarian 
and post-authoritarian states, where the political context shaping judicial decision- making is less 
fluid, and the institutional safeguards protecting judicial independence and authority are less 
secure.10  
  Interests-oriented explanations for judicial assertiveness hold that judges, motivated by 
the goal of realizing their policy preferences, will act on their sincere preferences when they can, 
but will adjust their behavior to minimize any risk to their authority to realize their policy 
preferences as closely as possible.11 A strategic judiciary would avoid risking losing its authority 
by asserting itself against an authoritarian regime, except when the regime’s power is fragmented 
or a new political dispensation is imminent.12 Therefore, interests-based scholars cannot explain 
high risk judicial activism, where the judiciary risks likely retaliation when acting assertively, 
but does so anyway.13  
  Ideas-oriented scholars have largely focused on the way ideas shape judicial outcomes, 
examining how the institutional and political contexts embed judicial attitudes, normative 
principles, and notions about the proper role of courts in the institutional fabric of the judiciary, 
which then shape judicial behaviour.14 This scholarship provides useful guides for explaining the 
internalization of judicial norms and preferences through socialization, diffusion, learning and 
 5 
selection, all of which can influence judicial decision-making.15 Institutional settings guide the 
behaviour and expectations of judiciaries by determining both which actors have more or less 
power over judges, and which actors’ norms and understandings of justice and rationality have 
primacy.16 This historical institutionalist literature can explain high-risk judicial activism by 
pointing to the entrenchment of judicial ideas that motivate judicial assertiveness even in 
unfavourable political environments. Yet ideas-oriented scholars tend to only explain judicial 
activity in particular domains or locations, rather than providing a systemized framework for 
explaining how ideas, institutions, and actors interact to contribute to understanding outcomes 
across multiple settings.17 What is needed is an explanation for judicial assertiveness that 
explains the possibility of high-risk judicial assertiveness and is generalizable across 
authoritarian regimes.  
 
Judicial Audiences in Authoritarian Regimes: 
 
I integrate ideas-oriented and interests-oriented approaches, using what Baum (2007) calls an 
“audience-based” perspective.18 Baum’s audience-based perspective recognizes that judges do 
not merely seek good policy, and the authority to realize their understanding of good policy. 
Instead judges also value esteem from people with which they have relationships, for both 
material and non-material purposes. The judges’ audiences, for the purposes of this discussion, 
could be political institutions, civil and political organizations or social and professional 
groupings, that are attentive to the decisions that judges make, and that judges, have reasons to 
seek approval or support from, when making decisions. The reasons judges seek approval from 
these audiences include judges’ material interests (including the advancement of their careers) 
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and non-material interests (including the desire for esteem building and job satisfaction).19 
According to the audience-based perspective, this pursuit of approval from judicial audiences for 
both material and non-material purposes shapes judicial behavior.  
  Judges do not simply get to pick and choose their audiences based on their preferences.20  
Instead, different institutional designs connect the judiciary formally and informally to different 
audiences.21 Institutional interlinkages are defined as links to the internal rules and processes of 
the judiciary that allow external actors to shape the internal structure and culture of the 
institution. The institutions, organizations, and networks that sustain institutional interlinkages 
with the judiciary are the critical audiences for the judiciary22  
  If the regime or affiliated allies have a role in appointments, promotions, and disciplining 
of judges, I describe this as a utilitarian interlinkage with the judiciary, as attention to regime 
preferences is essential to a judge’s career advancement and security. If the social and 
professional networks that serve as recruitment feeders for the judiciary are tied to or benefit 
from the regime, then the regime possesses normative interlinkages with the judiciary, as 
attention to regime preferences is essential to a judges’ professional esteem within his or her 
network.  
  Authoritarian regimes vary in the degree to which they sustain utilitarian and normative 
interlinkages with the judiciary. This variation determines the degree to which the authoritarian 
regime constitutes the dominant audience shaping the norms and preferences underlying judicial 
behavior.23 Where the regime constitutes the dominant audience, only judges who sincerely share 
or strategically endorse the preferences and values of the regime will advance their careers and 
enhance their esteem. Thus, the regime can ensure that norms and preferences underlying 
judicial behavior align with the regime’s interests. In its decisions, the judiciary can support the 
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regime either by legitimizing the political agenda of the regime, or by deferring to the actions 
and authority of the regime. Alternatively, it can act assertively against the regime by 
challenging the regime’s agenda and authority in its decisions. To capture this variation in 
regime-judicial interlinkages and its impact on judicial behavior towards the regime, I propose a 
four-part typology. Each configuration of regime-judicial interlinkages should result in a varied 
mix of judicial deference, legitimization, and assertiveness, but with one form of judicial 
behavior more common than the others. 
Table 1: A Typology of Judicial Relationships with Authoritarian Regimes 
 
 
 
Normative Interlinkages  
 
Utilitarian 
Interlinkages  
 
 
Yes 
(Social and/or Professional 
Networks are Recruited 
from are Aligned with the 
Regime)  
No 
(Social and/or Professional 
Network Judges are Recruited 
from are not Aligned with the 
Regime)  
 
Yes 
(Appointing 
Authority/s Aligned 
with the Regime)  
 
Loyal Court  
(Support for the Regime’s 
Agenda and Deference to its 
Authority)  
Controlled Court  
(Deference to the Regime’s 
Authority)  
No 
(Appointing 
Authority/s 
Independent from 
the Regime) 
Collaborative Court  
(Support for the Regime’s 
Agenda)  
Competitive Court  
(Assertiveness Against the 
Regime)  
 
  A Controlled Court shares utilitarian interlinkages with the ruling coalition of the 
regime, i.e. regime officials or their allies govern the career trajectory of judges, through the 
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appointment, removal, promotion, and disciplining processes common to all judiciaries. Where 
the regime shapes the career advancement of judges, it will recruit judges who either support the 
regime or are, at least, risk-averse and pliable enough to avoid challenging the regime. Hence, a 
controlled court will be characterized primarily by a pattern of deferential support to the regime 
where the judiciary reads its jurisdiction narrowly, avoiding taking up litigation challenging the 
regime, and refraining from intervening in the actions of the regime when it does.  
  A Collaborative Court shares normative interlinkages with the regime, i.e. the judiciary 
comprises judges recruited from social and professional networks that benefit from, and are 
supportive of, the regime. The idea that the social and professional sources of judicial 
recruitment shape the values and ideals of these judges is well established among law and society 
scholars.24 Woods (2009) highlights how the communities or networks in which judges are 
embedded, shape the thinking of judges through processes of informal interactions.25 Judges 
train, work and socialize with these networks prior to being appointed, and continue to be 
embedded within these networks even after being appointed. These networks shape judges’ 
perceptions of what are acceptable and unacceptable actions for judges to take. For example, 
networks of state bureaucrats that depend on regime support and are disconnected from civil 
society may be more inclined to endorse deference to executive institutions. Alternatively, 
politically active, self-regulatory bar associations may be less tied to the regime, and therefore 
less inclined to support an authoritarian executive. It is not inevitable that judges recruited from 
bar associations are necessarily assertive, or judges recruited from the judicial bureaucracy are 
necessarily deferential. Bar associations can be coopted or controlled by an authoritarian regime, 
and state bureaucracies may maintain autonomy and preserve their own institutional values. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the social and professional networks judges come from, 
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and the ideological milieu legal practitioners engage with through their education, occupations 
and social and professional interactions in potential pathways to the superior judiciary.  
  When the judiciary is recruited from, and embedded in, a professional network that is tied 
to, and supportive of, the regime, we should see a collaborative judiciary, as judges are 
socialized to support the agenda of the regime, and their esteem with these networks would 
suffer from challenging or delegitimizing the state. Hence, collaborative courts will be 
characterized by a pattern of legitimization of the regime’s agenda, where the judiciary will take 
up litigation challenging the regime, and rule in favour of the regime, articulating a legal 
rationale that legitimizes the agenda of the regime. 
 In the Loyal Court, the regime has both utilitarian and normative interlinkages with the 
judiciary, as the key audience/s that control the career path of judges are aligned with or include 
the regime and its affiliated elites, and the judges are recruited from networks that are aligned 
with the regime. The loyal court’s jurisprudence is characterized by deference to the authority of 
the regime and legitimization of its agenda. The judiciary will read its own powers and 
jurisdiction narrowly to provide the regime maximum autonomy, and where the judiciary takes 
up litigation, it will rule in the regime’s favour, legitimizing the regime’s actions and agenda.   
  In the Competitive Court, the regime and the judiciary enjoy no institutional interlinkages 
and thus the regime cannot shape the norms and preferences of the judiciary. The competitive 
court will not see itself as deferential to the regime nor share the regime’s ideological agenda. It 
is less likely to read its powers narrowly to avoid challenging the regime, or to uphold the agenda 
of the regime. Instead, the Competitive Court will develop norms and preferences that differ 
from the regime, and where their interests and ambitions clash, it is more likely to compete and 
clash with the regime.  
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  Thus, I argue that the judiciary converges on a set of institutional norms and preferences 
in response to the preferences of the institutions and networks, or “audiences,” with which judges 
interact, both individually and institutionally, and these norms and preferences shape the 
judiciary’s behavior towards the regime. The audience-based explanation incorporates insights 
from, and corrects shortcomings of both interest-oriented and ideas-oriented explanations. It 
demonstrates how the judiciary’s relationship with the regime shapes institutional norms and 
preferences, which often explain judicial behavior better than rational calculations about risks to 
the judiciary’s policymaking authority. The effect of this relationship on the norms and 
preferences of the judiciary can explain judicial assertiveness against an authoritarian regime, 
even when the judiciary’s policy-making authority is at risk, or judicial support for a regime, 
even when this support restricts the judiciary’s own policy-making authority. Variation in 
institutional interlinkages improves upon ideas-oriented historical institutionalist explanations, 
developing a generalizable framework for explaining variation in the ideas shaping judicial 
outcomes across authoritarian regimes.  
 
Pakistan: From Loyalty to Competition 
 
Pakistan has been ruled by the military for much of its history (1958-1972, 1977-1988 and 1999-
2008).26 In this study, I compare three periods of military rule in Pakistan’s history: the regimes 
of Ayub Khan (1958-1968), Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988), and Pervez Musharraf (1999- 2008). Under 
Ayub, the judiciary was a Loyal Court, using its powers to uphold and legitimize the actions and 
authority of the regime. Under Zia, the judiciary was a Controlled Court, reading its own role 
and jurisdiction narrowly to avoid challenging the regime. Under Musharraf, the judiciary was a 
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Competitive Court, and the regime found it progressively more difficult to ensure the judiciary’s 
compliance, as the judiciary expanded its powers to compete with the regime, and ultimately 
clashed directly with the regime. Table 2 outlines the variation in institutional interlinkages 
across these regimes, which, I argue, explain variation in judiciary-regime relationships. In this 
cross-temporal analysis, I show how changes in the demographics, training, socialization and 
appointment processes of judges over time, reduced interlinkages between each regime and the 
judiciary and altered the audiences shaping judicial norms and preferences. This, I argue, 
explained the judiciary’s shift from loyal collaboration under Ayub to competition and 
confrontation under Musharraf. 
Table 2: Judicial-Regime Relationships Across Pakistan’s Regimes 
 
 Ayub Khan Regime Zia-ul-Haq Regime Pervez Musharraf 
regime 
Utilitarian 
Interlinkages 
Yes Yes No 
Normative 
Interlinkages 
Yes No No 
Court Type Loyal Court Controlled Court Competitive Court 
 
The Loyal Court under Ayub Khan – 1958-1968 
 
  Ayub Khan was Pakistan’s first military ruler, and during his regime, the judiciary was a 
loyal collaborator, upholding and legitimizing military dominance in Pakistan’s political order. I 
argue that this loyalty was a product of an institutional norm of collaboration with, and deference 
to, the military, entrenched during this period. Under Ayub, the judiciary was appointed by the 
regime, and from a bureaucratic and legal elite that was closely tied to the military elite. The 
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regime was the key audience shaping judicial norms and preferences, ensuring judicial loyalty. 
  In 1958, Ayub Khan, the Chief of Army Staff, declared martial law, ousting the federal 
and provincial parliaments and governments, and abrogating the constitution. Within a month, in 
the judgment Dosso v State, the Supreme Court validated the proclamation of martial law, and 
also held that the regime’s authority and orders were immune judicial scrutiny.27 Over the next 
few years, the judiciary, in its judgments, showed “remarkable faith in the regime’s pursuit of the 
common good.”28 Even after the regime introduced a new constitution in 1962 and restored 
fundamental rights, courts continued to uphold the regime’s executive prerogatives, while 
developing some procedural checks on the regime’s actions.29 The judiciary collaborated in the 
regime’s suppression of left-wing and nationalist political parties, and set lenient procedural 
standards for legislative and executive actions, including detaining political leaders.30  
   This support for the regime could not simply be explained by strategic acquiescence to a 
powerful regime. Strategic judges seeking to avoid confronting the regime had options other than 
upholding the regime’s authority. The high courts had the discretionary authority to avoid taking 
up legal questions that directly concerned the military’s authority. In Dosso v State (1958), the 
Court simply had to determine whether a set of criminal regulations continued to apply after the 
abrogation of the constitution, but the Court chose to use the petition as a vehicle for legitimizing 
the coup. In Dosso and subsequent judgments, the courts upheld the policies and discretion of the 
regime, defending the merits, principles and necessity of these policies. The manner in which the 
judiciary used its powers and discretion, indicates that strategic caution was not the only 
motivation for supporting the regime.  
  Outside the courts, there is also evidence that judges did not simply acquiesce to the 
regime’s authority. Senior judges were also the architects of the constitutional framework that 
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provided the regime with unbridled executive power, and acted as legal advisers to the military 
regime.31 This was not simply a case of judicial deference, as judges actively assisted the regime 
in legitimizing and expanding the regime’s powers. 
  Therefore, I argue, the pro-regime inclination of the judiciary is best explained by the 
institutional norms and preferences of the judiciary, shaped by its institutional interlinkages with 
the regime. The institutional interlinkages between the civil-military bureaucracy and the 
judiciary ensured the regime was a critical audience in shaping judicial norms and preferences, 
and served to reproduce a pro-military inclination within High Courts.  
  The first institutional interlinkage is the regime’s utilitarian interlinkage with the 
institutional hierarchy of the judiciary, determining appointments and promotions. The judges of 
the High Courts were appointed by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of 
Pakistan and the Chief Justice of the High Court. In practice, judges were unlikely to recommend 
someone who the President was likely to reject, and the President could ignore the 
recommendations of Chief Justices and select his own candidates, often from the executive 
bureaucracy.32 Ayub personally interviewed candidates short listed for high courts appointments, 
and rejected candidates for arbitrary reasons.33 Thus, Ayub’s regime played the primary role in 
judicial appointments and promotions, and ensured that judges who were appointed and rose up 
the ranks, were those likely to decide in support of the regime.  
“There was no real gap between the judiciary and the military. To become a judge, you 
spent your time ingratiating yourself to the establishment [a popular term for the nexus of 
the military and civilian bureaucracy]. Very few lawyers seeking judicial appointments 
would be out there agitating against the regime.”34  
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 The second institutional interlinkage with the regime was the pool from which judges 
were recruited. The judiciary arrived in three streams – from the federal Civil Service trained in 
the British- run Civil Service before independence, from the judicial services of the subordinate 
judiciary which was also fused with the provincial bureaucracies, and from lawyers, often trained 
in the United Kingdom. In the early years, members of Pakistan’s bureaucracies and leading 
lawyers were typically from elite families, trained with the values and ruling practices of British 
colonial rule: executive discretion with limited accountability.35 Thus, judges worked and trained 
in a social and professional network that favoured executive discretion and was disdainful of 
populism and partisan politics. Both the bureaucratic and legal elite emerged from pre-existing 
established elite networks that were the primary beneficiaries of military and bureaucratic rule. 
Thus, the judiciary and the regime shared strong normative interlinkages during this period. 
  The key audiences for judges seeking to build a career and build esteem were the military 
regime and regime-appointed chief justices, the bureaucratic elite of the civil services, and the 
legal elite. Under this system, anti-regime judicial activism could hardly be expected or 
condoned. Those who desired to be appointed or promoted needed the approval of the regime, 
and those who desired to build esteem as judges within the legal and bureaucratic elite had to 
present their distance from partisanship and redistributive politics and support for executive 
maintenance of law and order. Thus, the internal consensus was that the judiciary would 
collaborate with the military regime, and consolidate its executive authority, while carving out a 
place for the judiciary within the political order as a venue for upholding procedural rights. This 
consensus primarily explained the judiciary’s decision-making that did not just acquiesce to 
military dominance but served to legitimize and sustain it. One lawyer explained: 
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“These judges…were the new colonial masters. For them the role of the court was a 
carry-over of the British court. More of a court that stressed law and order and stability, 
like a colonial judge…[T]he courts represented the interests of the military class.”36 
The Controlled Court under General Zia-ul-Haq: 1977-1988 
 
  Zia-ul-Haq was Pakistan’s longest-ruling military ruler. After initial friction between his 
regime and the judiciary, the judiciary was deferential and submissive to the regime, readings its 
own jurisdiction narrowly, and avoiding any clashes with this regime. I argue that this deference 
was a product of an institutional norm of caution and submission that was entrenched during this 
period. Under Zia, the judiciary was increasingly recruited from networks of middle-class 
lawyers with fewer ties to the military elite, but the regime tightened its control over judicial 
careers to ensure the judiciary stayed under the regime’s control.  
  When Zia came to power after ousting Pakistan’s first elected civilian government, both 
the military and Supreme Court sought to construct a collaborative relationship similar to the one 
in place under Ayub Khan. When Nusrat Bhutto, the wife of the ousted Prime Minister, filed a 
petition in the Supreme Court challenging the legality of the coup, the Court validated the coup 
as “necessary” to resolve the crisis Zia’s elected predecessors had created.37 The Court outlined a 
collaborative relationship, in which the regime was provided wide discretion to take actions 
deemed necessary to achieve its aims, and the judiciary had the power to determine the standard 
of necessity these actions had to meet. 
  But as the government grew more repressive, the younger judges of the High Courts 
increasingly diverged from the military regime over what actions were ‘necessary’ to achieve the 
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regime’s goals, and accepted petitions challenging the actions of the regime. The Sindh High 
Court objected to the detention of two former ministers of the ousted government, warned 
martial law authorities against detaining anyone without a trial, and placed limits on the regime’s 
authority to violate fundamental rights beyond what was deemed “necessary.”38 Other high 
courts followed suit, setting aside convictions by military courts, and overturning detentions by 
martial law authorities.39 The regime could not tolerate this increasing divergence between the 
regime and the judiciary, and moved to take control of the judiciary.  
  In 1981, Zia introduced a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), that drastically 
weakened the judiciary and reshaped its composition to weed out all judges who would challenge 
the regime. Orders and actions taken by the regime were now considered to have been validly 
made and Zia ordered judges to take a new oath under the PCO, forcing them to recognize the 
PCO and the reduction of the judiciary’s authority. Those judges who could not or would not 
take the oath, were automatically removed from the judiciary. Most judges were willing to take 
the oath and keep their jobs.40  
  From 1981 to 1985, the superior judiciary largely surrendered to military control. Over 
the course of these five years, there were only thirty eight reported judgments pertaining to the 
military’s prerogatives, a far cry from the period between 1977 and 1981.41 Few cases of 
constitutional importance were brought before High Courts, and those raising important 
constitutional questions were returned by courts or were never fixed for hearing before judges. 
Thus, the judiciary remained largely silent on the military regime’s actions. 
   The judiciary’s silence can be partly attributed to strategic caution in the face of an 
unfettered military dictator, as well as the loss of jurisdiction to actually issue judgments that 
challenged the regime. But the judiciary’s approach also reflected the entrenchment of the 
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judiciary’s self-conception during this period as a submissive and deferential subordinate to 
military rule. Judges would seek out the advice of government lawyers on the powers of the 
judiciary, and whether there were challenges to the actions of the martial law authorities that it 
could even accept for hearing.42  
“if someone had been arrested or detained, as a young activist lawyer I would to go the 
judges seeking relief from the courts. Informally, they would request the Advocate 
General or Assistant Advocate General for relief for the detainee, but they would refuse 
to hear these cases.”43 
 
  Further, after Zia fully restored the jurisdiction of courts in 1985, and abolished military 
courts, the judiciary responded cautiously, first refusing to hear the growing number of petitions 
challenging past decisions by the former military courts, and only gradually accepting more 
petitions and asserting its authority. Even after Zia died and democracy was restored in 1988, the 
judiciary refrained from challenging the military, and was often accused of assisting the military 
in weakening civilian governments while shielding the military’s prerogatives from civilian 
interference.44 Thus, this acquiescent approach to the military could not be explained solely by 
the context of jurisdictional constraints and strategic caution.  
  This norm of submission and deference came after Zia responded to the gradual 
divergence between the military and the judiciary by extending his control over the appointments 
and careers of judges. The diminishing of the judiciary’s normative interlinkages with the regime 
explained the increasing divergence and the strained collaboration between the two institutions in 
the early years of Zia’s regime. The normative interlinkages diminished for two reasons. First, 
the 1973 Constitution ended the recruitment of judges from the federal bureaucracies, which 
 18 
removed one key network of pro-military elites from the ranks of the judiciary.  A majority of 
judges were now recruited laterally from the bar of practicing lawyers. 
  Second, the pool of practicing lawyers from which judges were recruited was itself 
changing. With the growth of commercial law, elite lawyers who previously populated high 
court benches were now gravitating towards the greater monetary rewards of commercial law, 
and “successful lawyers were unwilling to sacrifice this (to become judges).”45 Conversely, for 
middle-class lawyers who could not get jobs in elite commercial firms, the salary and perks of a 
high court judgeship still promised social mobility and economic stability. These middle-class 
lawyers did not have the same elite ties with the military and bureaucratic elite as the post-
colonial legal elite did, nor had they enjoyed the same benefits from military rule. Hence, the 
networks judges were recruited from were less tied to or supportive of military supremacy.46 
Further, these lawyers were trained in local law schools, where procedural training steadily 
declined from the 1970s onwards.47 Given the diminishing familiarity with procedure, lawyers 
who later became judges, focused on “appearing bold and effective among the lawyers” to 
develop their reputations.48 These judges cared more about pronouncing popular judgments 
rather than demonstrating legal and procedural expertise, as a means to cultivating a reputation 
with lawyers in courtrooms.49    
  Thus, fewer judges were recruited from the pro-military legal and bureaucratic elite, and 
most judges were recruited from a pool of middle-class lawyers, with fewer connections to the 
military elite. These judges were increasingly concerned about building a reputation within the 
bar through outcomes that were popular with lawyers. Thus, the normative interlinkages between 
the judiciary and the regime were declining, while the linkages between the judiciary and the bar 
were strengthening. 
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  Zia responded to the diminishing normative interlinkages by deepening the utilitarian 
interlinkages between the regime and the judiciary. Nearly all judges appointed under his civilian 
predecessor had either resigned or been removed when Zia purged the judiciary in 1981.50 The 
recruitment of judges was primarily in the hands of Zia and a handful of judges, lawyers and 
bureaucrats who had a close relationship with Zia and his junta.  Lawyers had to stay in the 
“good books of the generals in power” to become judges.51 Thus, even as judges were 
increasingly appointed from the more independent bar of practicing lawyers, the regime 
appointed lawyers who were unwilling to “rock the boat” and had proven this through their time 
as government lawyers.52      
  Zia further enforced his control over the judiciary during this period through his powers 
to confirm judges. Only once a judge is confirmed is his or her tenure secured till retirement. The 
intended practice was that a judge was appointed as an ad-hoc judge before being confirmed 
within two years. However, Zia routinely violated this expectation, maintaining the ad-hoc status 
of judges, and only confirming appointments of High Court chief justices “in the last month or so 
of the appointments.”53  
“What can a judge do when the sword of confirmation hangs over his head? An Adhoc 
judge needs a lot of courage, sense of duty and high degree of idealism...to risk his job by 
annoying the powers that be.”54  
 Thus, the military-led executive strengthened utilitarian interlinkages with the judiciary, 
and those who moved forward in their judicial careers were those willing to acquiesce to the 
regime. This was the era of the controlled court in Pakistan, where a norm of submission to the 
will of the military dominated the judiciary’s internal culture. A senior lawyer explained: 
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“During Zia’s time…[t]he judges were concerned: what does the military want? We do not want 
to offend the military.”55  
 
 
The Competitive Court under General Musharraf: 1999-2008 
  Under General Musharraf, after an initial period of cautious deference, the judiciary grew 
progressively more assertive, expanding its jurisdiction and role in the political system and 
challenging the regime’s core interests, leading to a confrontation between the regime and the 
judiciary. I argue this competition was a product of a shift in institutional norms towards judicial 
independence and role expansion within the political system. Under Musharraf, the judiciary was 
recruited from a network of lawyers with few ties to military elite, and the regime’s control over 
judicial appointment was also diminished, as the judiciary consolidated control over the 
appointment process.  
  In October 1999, when General Musharraf seized power, the judiciary once more ruled 
on the validity of the military coup. In Zafar Ali Shah v Pervez Musharraf (2000), the Supreme 
Court heard a petition from a recently ousted parliamentarian challenging Musharraf’s coup. 
Musharraf forced judges to swear an oath to the very Provisional Constitutional Order which was 
being challenged in this petition, and purged the judiciary of judges he feared might challenge 
the regime. A majority of judges took the oath in order to preserve their careers.56 Significantly, 
however, six justices of the Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice, refused to take the oath 
choosing to step down. The unprecedented en bloc refusal by Supreme Court judges 
demonstrated the growing independence of the judiciary from the military. The newly purged 
Court upheld the coup on similar grounds of necessity as had been used to uphold Zia’s coup, 
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and granted Musharraf wide discretionary powers.57 But the Court held that the judiciary 
maintained its powers of judicial review and enforcement of fundamental rights. It stated that the 
judiciary had a vital role in facilitating “economic growth and social development” and even held 
that it would overturn any validly passed constitutional amendment undermining judicial 
independence. Thus, the judiciary granted itself a far broader role than previous coup-validating 
judgments had done.  
  In Musharraf’s early years, the judiciary did not contest the regime’s political agenda and 
authority, but it emphatically protected its own jurisdiction and authority, and then asserted and 
expanded its role in questions of socio-economic justice, stretching its jurisdiction over the ruling 
military’s growing real estate and commercial empire. For example, the high courts extended 
their jurisdiction over the land allocation decisions of the military’s housing cooperation, and 
curtailed the discretionary powers of the military’s cantonment administrative authorities.58 After 
2005, this focus on socio-economic justice built up into an unprecedented phase of judicial 
activism, as the expansive role of the judiciary percolated upwards from the High Courts before 
being adopted by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in the Supreme Court. The judiciary started 
challenging the military’s core security prerogatives and primary governing agenda, including, 
most famously, overturning the privatization of Pakistan Steel Mills, a cornerstone of the 
regime’s economic policy .59  
  The figures below summarize and compare all reported military-related jurisprudence 
during the regimes of General Zia (1977-1988) and General Musharraf (1999-2008) (Coding is 
detailed in Appendix 1).60 Figure 1 shows that, year to year, the judiciary ruled against the 
military in a higher proportion of cases under Musharraf than under Zia, as the judiciary ruled 
against the military in a majority of the reported judgments almost every year under Musharraf.61  
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  The graph also differentiates assertive jurisprudence of the two periods based on the 
military’s three types of prerogatives. The first set of prerogatives include the military’s control 
over its core structure and security mission.62 The second set deal with the military’s economic 
assets and activities.63 The third set are political and policymaking prerogatives, including the 
granting of non-security executive, legislative and judicial functions to the military. The military 
is likely to be more protective of its security and economic prerogatives as these are crucial to 
maintaining its autonomy from other institutions. Therefore, military regimes are most likely to 
retaliate against challenges to these prerogatives.64 A controlled court would read its jurisdiction 
narrowly, avoiding challenging the ruling military’s security and economic prerogatives. A 
competitive court would read its jurisdiction broadly, and be more willing to hold the ruling 
military’s economic and security prerogatives up to judicial scrutiny. During Zia’s regime, the 
controlled court did not assert itself against the military’s economic and security prerogatives. 
Conversely, during Musharraf’s regime, a majority of rulings against the military dealt with 
economic and security prerogatives, making the judiciary’s challenges against the military during 
Musharraf’s regime riskier.  
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Figure 1: Comparing Judicial Assertiveness under Zia and Musharraf Regimes65 
 
Further, in each judgment, the judiciary has three options: i) to uphold the military’s action and 
authority, ii) to challenge the particular exercise of military power, but not the military’s power 
to carry out such actions, and iii) to challenge the military’s action and contest the authority of 
the military to carry out such actions. Figure 2 shows the judiciary increasingly willing to contest 
the military’s prerogatives during Musharraf’s regime. 
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Figure 2: Comparing Judicial Contestation under Zia and Musharraf regimes 
 
 Thus, the judiciary was significantly more willing to issue rulings against the military, 
and contest the military’s prerogatives during Musharraf’s regime. This increasing assertiveness 
was risky and led to retaliation from the regime. 
   On March 8th 2007, the Supreme Court issued notice to the government regarding the 
recovery of people who had been missing after being detained by intelligence agencies66 The 
following day Musharraf pressured Chief Justice Chaudhry to resign, but Justice Chaudhry 
refused. Video and images of Musharraf ordering a defiant Chaudhry to resign, and later of 
security officials manhandling Chaudhry, spread across the media and became the catalyst for a 
nationwide backlash against Musharraf’s regime led by the lawyers of the bar associations. 67 
The Lawyers’ Movement, as it came to be known, turned the dismissal of the Chief Justice into a 
massive public controversy that dominated the headlines for months. In June 2007, the Court 
rejected the dismissal of the Chief Justice and ordered his reinstatement, adding that, for the 
judiciary, “The time has come to put the nation on a right path…so as to strengthen the country 
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and to remove all excessive and colourable exercise of power in…every sphere of 
government.”68 The Court overturned the actions of the military dictator, and articulated a broad 
mission for the judiciary to save and transform the country. 
  After Chaudhry’s return, the judiciary grew more assertive, challenging the regime’s core 
interests regularly. Between August and November 2007, the courts began hearing cases 
pertaining to the exile of Musharraf’s political opponents, political deals being made by the 
regime with political parties, security operations being carried out by the military, and even 
Musharraf’s right to retain the Presidency while he remained Chief of Army Staff.69 In response, 
the regime declared a state of emergency, and a new Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) was 
announced, and judges were once more asked to take a new oath under the new PCO. This time, 
in an unprecedented show of defiance, 63% of the superior court judges refused to take the oath, 
leading to the largest purge of the judiciary in Pakistan’s history.70 Musharraf ‘s actions 
backfired and unprecedented agitation on the streets grew, as lawyers, civil society activists, and 
political parties resisted curfews and arrests and continued to pour out on the streets calling for a 
return to democratic rule. Thus, Musharraf, whose regime seemed so stable a year earlier, was 
forced out of power by 2008, as a result of a confrontation with a competitive and unyielding 
judiciary. 
  The judiciary’s progressively increasing assertiveness can be partly attributed to the 
activist leadership of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, but it was by no means solely his 
leadership that reshaped the judiciary.71 The high courts were already expanding the judiciary’s 
role and intervening in socio-economic issues, including regulating the economic interests of the 
military before Chaudhry became Chief Justice. Nor was this assertiveness merely a response to 
regime weakness or fragmentation. The regime was less centralized than Zia’s regime, but was 
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stable when the judiciary began directly challenging the regime in 2006, with Musharraf’s 
political allies firmly in control of the parliament, and his political opponents vanquished and 
mostly in exile.72  
   This growing assertiveness was the product of the diminished role of the regime and its 
allies as key audiences shaping the norms and preferences of the judiciary. Under Musharraf, a 
competitive court emerged, with limited institutional interlinkages between the judiciary and the 
regime. The regime’s utilitarian interlinkages with the judiciary were now limited, as the chief 
justices gained formal primacy in the judicial appointment process.73 In the preceding democratic 
decade, the fragmented political environment enabled the judiciary to gain new relevance as a 
site for settling political disputes between the prime minister and presidency. The Supreme Court 
took advantage of this new relevance and fragmented political environment to reinterpret the 
‘consultation’ process between the chief Justice and the President in judicial appointments, 
determining that the President was bound to accept the advice of the chief justice on judicial 
appointments.74 During Ayub and Zia’s regime, when vacancies opened in a High Court, the 
Chief Justice of that High Court and the provincial and federal government, would prepare a 
short-list of names for elevation to the bench, and the Chief Justice of Pakistan would 
recommend names from the list to the President. But the President could ignore or bypass the 
recommendations of the Chief Justice, and make his own selection, which he usually did. 
However, during Musharraf’s regime, when the Chief Justices of the High Court, in consultation 
with the Law Ministry, would prepare a list of names for elevation to the bench, the Chief Justice 
of Pakistan would select names from that list, and the President was bound to implement the 
selection made by the Chief Justice. Thus, now the Chief Justices of the High Courts and 
Supreme Court had the primary role in the selection of judges. 
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  In appointing a judge from the bar, judges typically selected lawyers who had developed 
two types of reputation: i) with the judges themselves, and ii) with senior and influential lawyers 
with which the judges had ties. One judge explained that during the previous regimes 
“Uniformed and bureaucratic contacts were useful” but with the change in the judicial 
appointment process, the development of a “professional reputation as a lawyer” gained 
importance in the selection process, which meant building a reputation with High Court judges 
and senior lawyers, became crucial.75 Thus, judges gained primacy in the judicial appointment 
process, and the independent and politically active bar associations developed an informal role, 
while the role of the executive was reduced, weakening utilitarian interlinkages between the 
bench and the regime. 
  The normative interlinkages between the regime and judiciary had already decreased 
since the 1970s, as the judiciary was increasingly recruited from networks of middle-class 
lawyers that populated the bar associations. These interlinkages were strengthened during the 
democratic decade, as bar associations grew increasingly outspoken in their support for an 
activist judiciary that expanded its role in the political system, confronted executive power 
(civilian or military), and facilitated socio-economic justice. Judges seeking the esteem of bar 
associations through the outcomes of their judgments, had to at least pay lip service to the norms 
of the bar associations. During Musharraf’s regime, the bar associations did not acquiesce to 
military dominance, and openly campaigned against judges deemed to be collaborators with the 
regime.76 They refused to appear before judges who upheld the regime’s agenda, and published 
papers calling out judges who had ‘bad reputations,” naming and shaming them for corruption 
and complicity.77 Thus, bar associations exercised their power over judges’ reputations, to 
pressure the judiciary into acting in line with the activist norms and preferences of the bar.78 As a 
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former judge explained, “Who is a judge’s audience? It is basically first the lawyers.”79 
   Under Musharraf, the judiciary’s increased assertiveness, and clashes with the regime can 
be best explained by the audiences shaping judicial norms and preferences. Over time, as 
institutional interlinkages between the judiciary and the regime diminished, and the bar’s role as 
an audience shaping judicial norms and preferences grew, the judiciary pursued a more 
ambitious and expansive political and policy-making agenda, placing it at odds with the regime 
on major issues.80 Thus, the events of 2007 that helped bring down the military regime, can best 
be understood as products of diminished institutional interlinkages between the regime and the 
judiciary. This competitive court was not loyal to or dependent upon the military, and pursued an 
expanded role in Pakistan’s political system, asserting itself against the regime and defying it at 
great political risk, triggering a dramatic clash between the courts and the regime. 
Applying the Audience-Based Framework Beyond Pakistan: 
 
In this section I briefly explore how the audience-based approach to explaining variation in 
judicial assertiveness against authoritarian regimes can be applied beyond Pakistan. The 
interlinkages between the superior judiciary and the regime in different authoritarian systems 
explains varying patterns of judicial assertiveness, as illustrated below. 
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Table 3: Judicial-Regime Interactions Across Authoritarian Regimes 
 
 
Normative Interlinkages  
 
Utilitarian 
Interlinkages  
 
 
Yes 
(Social and/or Professional 
Networks are Recruited 
from are Aligned with the 
Regime)  
No 
(Social and/or Professional 
Network Judges are Recruited 
from are not Aligned with the 
Regime)  
 
Yes 
(Appointing 
Authority/s Aligned 
with the Regime)  
 
Loyal Court  
(Indonesia 1971-1998)  
Controlled Court  
(Nigeria 1970s)  
No 
(Appointing 
Authority/s 
Independent from 
the Regime) 
 
Collaborative Court  
(Turkey 1960s)  
Competitive Court  
(Spain 1960 to 1975)  
 
Under the regime of General Suharto, Indonesia’s superior judiciary characterized a loyal court. 
This loyalty was a product of deep institutional interlinkages between the regime and judiciary. 
Suharto’s Ministry of Justice had direct control over judicial appointments and promotions and it 
used loyalty to the regime’s integrationist ideology as a key criterion for promotions to attractive 
positions. Most judges were recruited from the close-knit Javanese bureaucratic elite that were 
beneficiaries of Suharto’s regime, and Suharto coopted the Judges’ Association, to which most 
judges belonged.81 Thus, through close utilitarian and normative interlinkages, the regime 
became the primary audience shaping judicial norms and preferences. The result was a loyal 
judiciary that actively endorsed Suharto’s integrationist ideology and granted the regime almost 
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unchecked power and authority. Even after Suharto’s fall in 1998 in the face of widespread 
domestic opposition, the judiciary remained unwilling to assert itself against Suharto’s regime, 
leading to growing calls for urgent and drastic judicial reform.82 
  Nigeria’s superior judiciary was a controlled court under the military dictatorships of the 
1970s and 1980s. Judicial officers were appointed by the President of Nigeria and the state 
governors on the recommendations of their State Judicial Commissions which were appointed by 
the Governors. The President and Governors had both powers of appointment and removal of 
judges. Nigeria’s military dictators frequently used these powers to remove judges who were 
hostile to their interests. Thus, the utilitarian interlinkages between the regime and the judiciary 
ensured a silent submissive judiciary.83  
  Through the 1960s, the Turkish superior judiciary was a collaborative court. The 
military, bureaucracy, Republican Party, universities and judicial community, comprised what 
Belge (2006) calls the Republican alliance. They adhered to the Kemalist republican principles 
of secular top-down modernization and sought to place limits on majoritarian institutions where 
left-wing and identity based political parties could undermine this political project.84 Through a 
Kemalist legal education and the bureaucratic judicial structure, Kemalist norms and preferences 
were reproduced in the professional networks staffing the judiciary, and judges seeking to build 
esteem within these networks would adhere to these Kemalist norms.85 Accordingly, after the 
coup of 1960, when the military regime established the Turkish Constitutional Court, the Court 
used its powers expansively as the guardian of the regime’s ideological agenda.86 It acted 
assertively to protect the autonomy of republican state institutions and universities from political 
interference, while restricting the liberties of left-wing and identity-based political groups.87 
Close normative interlinkages between the Republican elites and the judiciary, ensured both 
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regime and judiciary collaborated in upholding the Kemalist political agenda.  
  In the later years of General Franco’s authoritarian regime, the Spanish judiciary was a 
competitive court, in which judges challenged the regime even at great personal and professional 
risk. Under Franco, regime control over the appointment process was limited, as the selection of 
new judges was largely entrusted to the judiciary itself.88 Further, in the 1960s, the legal 
community within Spain increasingly endorsed new norms of democracy and human rights. 
These norms diffused into the legal community through its ties to a liberalizing Catholic church, 
opposition parties within Spain, and activist lawyers and judges in neighbouring democratic 
European states.89 Thus, the regime’s limited control of the judicial appointment process and the 
growing support for democratic and human rights within the networks from which judges were 
recruited, led to the emergence of a competitive court in Spain. In his survey of Spanish judges 
in the 1970s, Toharia (1975) found that a majority of judges had an understanding of state-
society relations that was considerably at odds with the ideology of the Franco regime.90 By the 
1970s, a growing a number of judges belonging to the pro-democracy professional association, 
Justicia Democratia, took up important positions within the judiciary, and the judiciary became a 
site for high-risk assertiveness against the Franco regime.91  
  Thus, the audience-based framework provides us the analytical tools to understand 
patterns of interaction between the judiciary and a wide range of authoritarian regimes. It 
explains why some judiciaries are willing to act assertively against authoritarian regimes, even in 
the absence of any clear political space or opportunities, while other judiciaries will support 
authoritarian regimes, even after the regimes weaken or are ousted from power.  
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Conclusion: 
 
In this article, I argue that the judiciary’s affinity to authoritarian regimes diminishes as 
authorities and networks, or ‘audiences’, from which judges seek approval, to advance careers 
and build reputations, grow independent from the regime. The article devises a typology of 
judiciaries based on institutional interlinkages with authoritarian regimes. This typology 
connects the judiciary’s norms and preferences with the regime’s linkage to the 
promotion/selection process and its linkage to the pool from which judges are drawn. As we see 
in case studies from Pakistan and beyond, different configurations of institutional interlinkages 
between authoritarian regimes and judiciaries lead to variation in judicial assertiveness towards 
authoritarian regimes, as a consequence of the effect of these interlinkages on the norms and 
preferences of the courts. 
   This study adds to recent scholarship on judicial politics that calls for a reconsideration 
of judicial motivations beyond simply the realization of policy preferences. The analysis 
suggests that those interested in understanding judicial behavior in authoritarian settings should 
study the process of formation of judicial norms and preferences in relational terms, and consider 
how the institutional structure and sociological background of judges connect the judiciary with 
different audiences that shape their preferences. Therefore, it is not enough to either study the 
formal institutional structure of the judiciary or the social and professional networks of judges to 
understand judicial norms and preferences, and this framework brings both together to 
understand the development of judicial norms and preferences. In doing so, this article provides a 
comprehensive framework for explaining variation in judicial assertiveness both within and 
across authoritarian regimes.
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Appendix 1: Military-related jurisprudence under General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) and General 
Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008) 
 
Military-related jurisprudence refers to High Court and Supreme Court decisions reviewing laws 
pertaining to the military or actions taken by the ruling military under the regimes of General 
Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf. In order to qualify for this data-set, the case must 
challenge the interests or actions of the military and its subsidiary institutions. This criterion 
excludes judgments that may be based on military law, but in no way challenge the interests or 
actions of the military or its affiliated institutions. I code these judgments in three ways. 
  Each court decision can have three possible outcomes. The first outcome is that the court 
rules in favour of the military or its subsidiary institutions, not contesting the authority or actions 
of the military at all. The second outcome is that the court rules against that particular exercise of 
military power but does not challenge the military’s power to carry out such actions. The third 
outcome is that the court rules against the military’s action and shifts the authority of the military 
to carry out such actions either partially or completely to another civilian institution. I define the 
second and third categories as assertion, and I define the third category as contestation. A 
hypothetical example is useful to clarify the distinction between the three possible outcomes. The 
court has to rule on an appeal challenging a decision by the military’s own court martial 
proceedings. The court has three options in the final judgment. 1) The court can dismiss the 
appeal, not challenging the actions or the authority of the military courts to make that decision. 
2) The court can grant the appeal, ruling against the particular action taken by the military courts 
on procedural grounds (eg. the court did not carry out any evidentiary hearings during the 
proceedings), but not contesting the military court’s authority to make such a decision. 3) The 
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court can grant the appeal, ruling against the action taken by the military courts, on the 
determination that the appellant does not fall under the jurisdiction of the military courts, thus 
contesting the military court’s authority to hear cases pertaining to this class of accused. 
Accordingly, I first code decisions based on whether they qualify as assertion, i.e. whether they 
fall in the second and second third or not. Secondly, I code decisions based on whether they 
qualify as contestation, i.e. whether they fall into the third category or not. 
  Finally, I code decisions based on the military prerogative to which the decision pertains. 
By prerogative I mean a power or privilege the military presumes it has. There are three types of 
prerogative that Pakistan’s military holds. 
I) The Military’s Control over its Security Structure and Mission: This includes judgments 
dealing with the military’s control over formulating national security policy and carrying out 
security operations, and oversight of the forces involved in carrying out this security mission.  
II) The Military’s Control over its Economic Assets and Activities: This includes judgments 
dealing with the vast economic assets of the military and its subsidiary institutions. Pakistan’s 
military economy comprises three distinct segments: major public-sector organizations 
controlled by the army, the commercial subsidiaries that provide for the welfare of the army, and 
the vast real estate empire owned and administered by the army and a subordinate civilian 
bureaucracy.  
III) Military’s Control over Politics and non-Security Policy-Making Activity: These are cases 
where the military played a role in or took over the policy-making and political branches of 
government, unrelated to security. Thus, it covers the granting of non-security executive, 
legislative and judicial functions to the military. The jurisprudence pertaining to these functions 
typically increases during periods of military rule, as the military intervenes in all institutions of 
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governance. At the apex of the executive structure this includes formal seizures of executive 
power through military coups, and informal interventions in the political process to favour allied 
political parties. Below high-level political interventions, military officers are also recruited 
laterally into civilian bureaucracies. Legislatively, military regimes seek to create news laws and 
amend the constitution. And judicially, summary military courts have also been established to 
deal with criminal cases. 
 
 
 
 
